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Abstract
In this three-part article, I look at Francis Clooney’s 
work on comparative theology, identify one of the crucial 
problems of translation that comparative studies confront 
and outline the nature of a task for the twenty-first century 
cross-cultural theology. In the first part, I show that there 
is no unique ‘translation problem’ but that it actually 
names a plethora of problems. Such problems include 
not only the translation of texts across languages but 
also the philosophical problems of incommensurability 
of theories and inter-theoretic reductions. In the second 
part, I undertake a fairly close examination of aspects of 
Clooney’s enterprise. Here, I show that, quite contrary to 
what he promises, his project simply rehashes old dogmas 
of earlier Christian writers albeit in a hidden and implicit 
manner. In the third part, I suggest that we need to rethink 
some of the ingrained but hardly orthodox assumptions, if 
we intend to understand the cultures and practices which 
are other than those in the West. I suggest that a new 
theological practice is more adequate to our times than 
what we have inherited from the past.
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INTRODUCTION
The Oxford online dict ionary defines the word 
‘disingenuous’ as follows: “not candid or sincere, typically 
by pretending that one knows less about something than one 
really does.” This term suffers from ambiguity and a moral 
load. However, this paper will ultimately disambiguate the 
word and provide an explanation of its sub-title.
While doing comparative theology, especially when it 
involves two different cultures, we face what we can term 
as a ‘translation problem’: the issue of translating terms 
from one language into another. Say that the languages 
in question are English and Sanskrit. When we settle for 
‘God’ as a translation for ‘Brahma’, or for ‘Religion’ as 
a translation for ‘Dharma’, we face this problem. Even 
though anthropologists had confronted this problem earlier 
(Hodgen, 1988; Kay & Willet, 1984) and the Christian 
missionaries even before them (Lach, 1994; Neill, 2002), 
its sharpest formulation in philosophy is due to Quine 
(1960) where he speaks of a radical indeterminacy of 
translation. Many have had occasion to take issue with 
Quine, the most notable of whom is Donald Davidson 
(Davidson, 1984).
Clooney’s (2010) Comparative Theology, which I 
discuss in the following pages, takes up ‘Hinduism’ and 
Christianity as its units of comparison. His knowledge of 
Sanskrit and Tamil confronts him with this problem and 
he seems aware of its existence. As he says it explicitly, 
…I concede the necessary cautions about using Western, 
Christian, and English-language words to characterize realities 
otherwise described in their own traditional contexts. But it 
seems to me that this process of translation and adaptation is 
inevitable… (Clooney, 2010, p.78).
This caution is necessary because doing comparative 
theology while remaining a Christian is no sinecure. On 
the one hand, one has to remain within the confines of 
one’s religion, which makes absolute truth claims; on the 
other, one has to relate earnestly to faiths and traditions 
other than one’s own which appear as competitors. As 
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a Jesuit priest, Clooney is aware of walking a tightrope. 
He speaks of the “tension between open-mindedness and 
faith, diversity and traditional commitment” (Clooney, 
2010, p.21); of the “intense and difficult balance at the 
edge between traditions” that is at the heart of comparative 
theology (Clooney, 2010, p.80). He says too, “if we 
ourselves are faithful to our faith traditions and also intent 
upon honest encounter with other religious traditions, 
we are not going to escape the tension that energized and 
vexed the missionaries…” (Clooney, 2010, p.44).
It is important to notice how he has walked the 
tightrope and what its results are. The sub-title of his 
book, deep learning across religious borders, suggests 
that inter-religious learning should not only be “deep” 
but also that it is possible only at those borders where 
religions meet each other. We know for a fact that most 
Christian theologians have stayed at the centre while 
relating to other religions. Clooney promises to stay 
within the confines of Christianity, even as he touches its 
borders. In the process, he must also say what his solution 
to the translation problem is. Our expectations are raised 
very high. So are the stakes.
1.  THREE PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION
However, what exactly is ‘the translation problem’? 
Because there are a plethora of problems, all of which 
also embody ‘the’ translation problem, the difficulty lies 
in identifying its uniqueness. Here, I will outline some 
three such problems. Each of these is well-known, and 
I presuppose this familiarity because of which I shall be 
sketching them briefly and abstractly.
A. Consider abstractly any two natural languages 
X and Y. Here, the problem is of translating words and 
sentences from one into words and sentences of the other. 
‘X’ could be German and the word ‘Dasein’; ‘Y’ could 
be English, and the translation problem might involve 
the use of this word by Hegel and Heidegger. We can 
settle for a hyphenated equivalent: ‘there-being’ or ‘so-
being’. We might signal the different meanings of the 
word ‘Dasein’ in Hegel and Heidegger in glossaries or 
footnotes. The chosen English words might not accurately 
translate ‘Dasein’ as either of the two philosophers uses it. 
However, this difficulty does not prevent us from reading 
and understanding Hegel and Heidegger in English and 
writing reasonably accurate tracts on their philosophies. 
Exactly similar problems confront us, if we take 
Sanskrit as one language and English as the other: ‘God’ 
or ‘gods’ are not synonyms for ‘Brahman’ and ‘Devatas’ 
but this problem is no different from translating the 
Latin ‘Religio’ into the English ‘religion’. We can create 
glossaries and footnotes; we can introduce new words as 
translations (say, ‘pif paf’ as the translation of ‘Dharma’). 
We can enumerate the different meanings of ‘Dharma’ 
under the intension of ‘pif paf’ and leave it to the reader to 
learn the word-meaning.
In one sense, this is how we have solved translation 
problems involving technical words (‘gravitation’, ‘genes’, 
‘electric current’, etc.). If we can introduce new words 
into a language in one domain, we can do the same in 
other domains as well. One could introduce new words in 
the English language for some ‘untranslatable’ Sanskrit 
words; then these new words could become a part of the 
English language the way ‘pundit’, ‘karma’, ‘juggernaut’, 
etc. have become parts of the English vocabulary.
B. Consider now two theories formulated in two 
different natural languages. Let us say that the theories 
under question are those of Newton and Einstein. The 
problem is this: could we consider, say, the English 
word ‘mass’ in Newton’s theory as the equivalent of 
the German ‘masse’ in Einstein’s theory? Even though 
translation is involved (finding the equivalent of ‘mass’ 
in German), the problem is different: here, we are dealing 
with words as they are defined in different theories and 
notice that their meaning in each of these theories is 
different. Even when we know that ‘masse’ in German 
can translate the English ‘mass’, we cannot claim that 
these words are each other’s equivalents in these two 
rival theories. Consequently, we are talking about the 
translation of vocabulary of one rival theory into the 
vocabulary of another. That is, even though the actual job 
is also one of translating between two different languages 
(finding the German equivalent for the English ‘mass’), 
we are primarily concerned with the issue whether ‘mass’ 
in Newton’s theory is equivalent to ‘masse’ in Einstein’s 
theory. The adequacy of translation depends not on natural 
language dictionaries but on the logical and mathematical 
consequences of these two theories. Although there is also 
a translation problem here, there is the additional problem 
of incommensurability (Kuhn, 1962; Feyerabend, 1962; 
Sankey, 1994; Hoyningen-Huene & Sankey, 2001) of two 
theories in the same domain of physics.
C. Consider now two theories formulated in a single 
natural language, say English. Let us say one theory is 
from the domain of cognitive neuroscience and the other 
is from the domain of psychology. They are both about the 
‘same’ object, the human brain; they deal with the same 
topic, belief formation, say, ‘believing in God’. A MRI 
brain scan undertaken when some individual Christian 
prays shows that a particular sub-region of the brain is 
activated; psychology of religion describes the same 
activity in terms of ‘total surrendering to God’. Surely, 
there is also a translation problem here: translating the 
vocabulary of psychology of religion into the vocabulary 
of cognitive neuroscience. This is the problem of inter-
theoretic reduction (Hooker, 1981; Balzer, Pearce, & 
Schmidt, 1984; Patricia Churchland, 1986; Bickle, 1998) 
in philosophy of science.
Cultures and Translations
Consider the English language, which has a rich corpus 
of religious writings. (Here, I am completely ignoring the 
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problems involved in translating many such writings from 
Greek, Latin and other European languages into English.) 
In order to make the problem visible and tractable, let me 
just speak of ‘theology’, while ignoring texts like sermons, 
prayers, liturgy, etc. Even here, I speak only of ‘Christian 
theology’. Because there is no ‘single’ Christian theology 
but a multitude of them, let me use the convention of 
speaking about the language of theology in order to signal 
that theologies are at least theories of some kind and that 
there is a multitude of them. So, I speak of two kinds of 
languages: natural language and theological language. 
(Neither, as must be obvious, is meant in the singular.) 
From now on, when I speak of ‘theological language’, I 
refer to theologies in the English language. 
Because the theological language is in English, we 
confront the problem of translation between two natural 
languages, say English and Hindi, in the first place. 
Second, because theology is a set of theories, there 
is the additional problem of translating a theoretical 
vocabulary: words like ‘God’, ‘grace’, ‘salvation’, ‘sin’, 
etc. are theoretical terms in these theologies. In the third 
place, we confront the issue of identifying the target: into 
what are we translating these theoretical terms?
The last question is important because the answer 
specifies which issues we confront. If we make the claim 
that the terms from this theological language (considered 
as terms within theories) are being translated into another 
theory, we have to identify the kind of theories in question. 
That is to say, do we confront a problem related to finding 
equivalences between Newton’s theory and the theory of 
Einstein, or a problem similar to reducing psychology to 
cognitive neuroscience? If they are rival or competitor 
theories, we face the problem of incommensurability; in 
the second case, we have to answer issues raised by inter-
theoretic reduction.
There is another possibility not mentioned so far because 
it is not a translation problem in any straight forward sense. 
Is the attempt to translate concepts from the theological 
language into an Indian language akin to directly translating 
the vocabulary of evolutionary biology into that of an 
economic theory? Consider, for example, the theory of 
inflation. How could one translate ‘inflation’ directly in 
terms of ‘genetic drift’? One cannot. These two theories 
are not explaining the same phenomenon. Nor are they 
competing theories in the same domain. Even if one uses 
theories from modern evolutionary biology as metaphors 
to describe economic phenomena, the two theories do not 
relate to each other as source and target languages. An 
analogous situation could also confront us in the case of 
translating the theological language into an Indian language. 
Hence, the next question: are we translating terms from one 
theory into another that are neither each other’s rivals nor 
allow for a simple inter-theoretic reduction? 
However, if neither of the three is the case and we 
are merely translating theoretical terms into a natural 
language, the task is equivalent to translating, say, 
Einstein’s theory (formulated in English) into Hindi. In 
that case, one has to introduce new, technical terms for 
‘God’, ‘sin’, ‘salvation’ ‘justification’, ‘scripture’, etc. 
How to decide which is the case here?
Hitherto, this decision process took a very simple form 
of endorsing as true those assumptions that solved this 
problem in one particular way. People assumed that religion 
is a cultural universal and that the difference between the 
Indian and the western culture (among other things) lies 
in the differences between their ‘religions’. They also 
presupposed that both religions have notion(s) of ‘deity’, 
‘sin’, ‘salvation’ etc.; and that, therefore, both were talking 
about the same objects. Consequently, they were convinced 
that the theological languages are mutually translatable. 
Further, they also presupposed that these religions also have 
‘theologies’ and that they were rivals as a consequence. 
Thus, the difference between these theologies lay only in 
their content: for centuries, people in the West believed 
that the Christian theological language was richer (and 
thus superior) to the Indian theological language, the way 
Einstein’s theory is richer than Newton’s theory. 
If these assumptions are not made, it is difficult to say 
what kind of problems we confront when we translate 
from Sanskrit to English: Is ‘anruta’ to be translated as 
‘falsehood’ or not? Is ‘sat’ the same as ‘existence’ or ‘the 
real’ or neither? Is ‘atman’ the same as the ‘soul’, the ‘Self’ 
or the ‘personhood’ or none of these? Does the Buddha 
deny that human beings have ‘souls’ when, according 
to some interpretations, he formulates the ‘doctrine 
of anatta’ or does Shankara do the same as well even 
when he speaks about the ‘atman’? Is ‘Brahman’ to be 
translated as ‘God’ or are these two terms as unrelated to 
each other as ‘inflation’ and ‘genetic drift’?
Further: how should we solve these translation 
problems? Should we ask a pundit who has studied 
Sanskrit texts, but does not have a clue about what ‘soul’ 
or ‘falsehood’ or ‘existence’ means? Should we ask a 
‘westernized’ Indian academic who knows neither what 
‘soul’ is nor what ‘atman’ is but thinks he understands 
Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’? Alternatively, should we consult 
Monier-Monier Williams who uses a generic Christian 
theology to translate what he takes to be words from 
Indian ‘theologies’? Or should a German study Sanskrit 
in the hope that his native language will somehow 
give him access to Sanskrit without the mediation of 
many centuries of Christian translations of the Sanskrit 
language? Or should we train a new generation of Indians 
to access what they cannot ‘easily’ access today?
2.  ISSUES IN THE DISCUSSION
These are some of the questions that a twenty-first century 
comparative theology faces in its quest. Thus, Clooney 
must confront these questions and seek answers. If 
Clooney does not take up this job, there is only one route 
open to him: he has to presuppose as true what requires 
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the proof of its truth. That is, he has to presuppose the 
truth of the ‘consensus’ that has emerged from centuries of 
habitual Christian-theological thinking about self and the 
other. Inevitably, his ‘comparative theological study’ will 
then end up reproducing the very same descriptions that 
Christian theology has produced of the Indian culture and 
its traditions for centuries. In that case, it is impossible for 
his comparative theology to change “how we experience 
ourselves and our world” and to inculcate us with a new 
learning that “disabuses us of false ideas about the other” 
(p.78). Instead, it will keep our experience and ideas 
stable. Instead of touching the religious borders where 
“deep inter-religious learning” can take place, Clooney 
would firmly anchor himself at the centre by virtue of 
which no “learning” would be possible, deep or otherwise.
In this part, I intend to explore whether this prediction 
is true with respect to three issues: (a) the nature, (b) the 
need and (c) the character of comparative theology.
2.1  The Nature of Comparative Theology
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, most of these 
studies not only incorporated the belief that ‘Hinduism’ is 
the religion of the ‘Hindus’ but also the characterization 
of the Indian ‘gods’ and ‘goddesses’ as minions of the 
Devil. Because Clooney does not speak in these terms, 
the questions are: how else does he speak about the Indian 
deva’s and devi’s? Has he distanced himself from this 
stance or does he merely keep silent about it? To answer 
these, we need to look at a few examples.
A. Consider how he describes his experience at a 
shrine for Laksmi, the wife of Vishnu.
To visit this temple and stand before the Goddess Laksmi opened 
for me new possibilities of vision beyond what I had seen or 
thought before…I knew that according to the Hindu tradition 
I was also being seen by Her…There is no room for Laksmi 
in Christian theology, no easy theory that makes sense of Her 
presence…I suppose I might even have worshipped Her, because I 
was already there, as it were seeing and being seen. But Christians 
do not worship Goddesses, so I did not. (Clooney, 2010, p.102)
It is strange to read that there is “no room” for Laksmi 
in Christian theology; centuries of Christian theology say 
otherwise. What kind of an ontological claim is Clooney 
making? 
Here is one reading: Clooney is denying that God has 
eternal consorts and, therefore, also denies that Laksmi 
exists. This reading is supported by the fact that he does 
not claim that he is being seen by her in any absolute sense 
but only “according to the Hindu tradition.” Consequently, 
Clooney might want to say that while Hindu tradition 
affirms her existence, his Christian theology denies it. 
However, this cannot be the right reading of the passage 
because he affirms her presence (and thus her existence), 
when he says that there is “no easy theory that makes 
sense of her presence.” In other words, Clooney is 
affirming that Christian theology cannot easily make 
sense of her presence but not that it denies her existence. 
Here is another reading of the same passage: Christian 
theology allows the existence of Laksmi but not as a 
Goddess. However, this option is denied to us because 
Clooney explains that he did not worship her because 
“Christians do not worship Goddesses.” Of course, it is the 
case that one cannot possibly worship what does not exist; 
therefore, one could again argue that this explains why 
Clooney did not worship Laksmi. However, if Clooney 
wants to say that Laksmi’s existence as a goddess is denied 
by Christianity, there is no way she could provide him with 
the inspiration to draw parallels between Mother Mary and 
Laksmi. Any and every ordinary woman could be compared 
to Mary but that will not do for Clooney’s purposes: he 
needs that Laksmi exists in some non-human capacity, 
as someone related to a ‘god’ and thus as a goddess. 
Consequently, we must now assume that Christianity does 
countenance the existence of Laksmi as a goddess.
In that case, Clooney is making both statements: 
Christianity recognizes the existence of Laksmi as a 
goddess, while, at the same time, it denies her existence 
and thus fails to provide a “room” for her in its theology. 
How to understand this apparent contradiction?
There is one way to make sense of Clooney here: he is 
claiming that that there is “no room” in Christian theology 
for Laksmi as a true Goddess. However there is “room” 
for her as a false goddess. So, Clooney is saying this: 
there is no room in Christian theology for true goddesses, 
but there is room for false goddesses. Because Christians 
do not worship the latter, Clooney does not worship 
Laksmi. If this is the case, why does he not say it openly 
and dissimulate instead?
It is not easy to speak about Laksmi as a false goddess in 
the twenty-first century world which is why Clooney talks 
about the absence “easy theories” to explain the “presence” 
of Laksmi. Nor can he, theologically speaking, call Laksmi 
a false goddess and then go on to compare her with Mother 
Mary. That is why, on the one hand, he endorses millennia 
of Christian theology; on the other hand, he is also forced 
to be disingenuous by speaking half-truths.
B .  T h i s  i s  n o t  a  o n e - o f f  c a s e .  T h e  s a m e 
disingenuousness repeats itself when he speaks about the 
Vaishnava tradition and the mantras they use to do puja 
to Narayana. Here, Clooney wants to relate one of the 
Mantras from this tradition (“Aum, obeisance to Narayana 
with Sri”) to the Christian prayer (“Abba, Father”). He 
puts the result of this “inter-religious reading” this way:
An interreligious reading should at least mean that a Christian 
reader takes the mantras to heart and finds in them a way to 
hear and utter anew prayers central to the bible and Christian 
tradition. When we pray ‘Abba, Father,’ we can learn to hear an 
echo of the Tiru Mantra. (Clooney, 2010, p.80). 
Of course, he cannot possibly be saying the Narayana 
of the Vaishnavas is the God that Clooney worships. In 
that case, a formidable question opens up: given that the 
Christians pray only to God and worship only Him, how 
can a mantra directed at some other entity ever help such 
a prayer? Here, a variety of Christian theology with some 
modifications could help answer this question.
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Consider the following rather simple formulation of 
a Christian thought: God instilled a sense of divinity in 
man which expresses itself as hunger and thirst for Him. 
If unaided by God’s revelation that tells him who He is 
and how to worship Him, human beings can only devise 
human ways to worship God. Here is where the False God 
steps in and deceives the unaided human.
If the above idea is acceptable, we can make sense 
of Clooney. When he prays ‘Abba, Father’, all that a 
Christian can learn to hear are the echoes of those others 
who have not yet found this ‘true God’. He cannot hear 
the sound of the mantra; all he “can learn” to hear is 
its mere echo. Clooney’s inter-religious reading only 
apparently does not focus on false gods; this lack of focus 
is only ‘apparent’ because the mantras cannot substitute 
for the Christian prayer, which is directed only at the 
true God. Clooney implicitly says is that even when men 
worship entities other than God, Christians should take 
cognizance of their desire to worship the true God and not 
focus on the actual object of worship. If we do this, we 
can indeed hear the echoes of other ‘religiosities’; after 
all, false religion is also religion. Perhaps, while praying 
to God, the Christian can be grateful because he hears the 
echoes of those who still have not found Him. Even then, 
surely, this cannot be the “inter-religious learning” that 
Clooney is trumpeting, is it? To some extent, the answer 
to this question depends on what “inter-religious learning” 
means to Clooney. Here is his answer:
Even the more enclosed medieval European Christian era was 
not lacking in instances of interreligious learning. We can think 
here of Aquinas’s dialogue with Jewish and Muslim thinkers in 
the Summa Theologiae. (Clooney, 2010, p.39). 
Are we supposed to believe that Aquinas’ dialogue is 
the “deep learning” at the religious borders that Clooney 
talks about? If Aquinas ‘learnt’ from the Jewish and 
Muslim thinkers about his own religion through this 
dialogue, he must have learnt the most from Aristotle, a 
pagan thinker if ever there was one. If this is an instance 
of inter-religious learning, then the history of Christianity 
is the story of an unbroken process of inter-religious and 
intra-religious (surely, there were also ‘dialogues’ with the 
heretics) learning! This is disingenuous.
C. As a final example, let us look at how he talks about 
‘Hinduism’ and notice that the terms of description are 
entirely different from the way he thinks and speaks about 
Christianity. “Hinduism” is a set of human, cultural, and 
religious energies…beginning with the indigenous …
religious traditions of India, probably including the cult 
of multiple local gods and goddesses… (Clooney, 2010, 
p.85).
This Hinduism, as he says, included probably a cult 
of “local gods and goddesses.” However, the question is 
this: what makes these gods and goddesses ‘local’ and in 
which sense are they that? Surely, they could not be ‘local’ 
in the sense that only a group of people from a particular 
geographical region worshipped such entities; nor could 
this phenomenon be a ‘cult’ because the number of people 
worshipping such entities is not huge. If either is the case, 
the God of Israel will become ‘local’ as well; Judaism 
would be a ‘cult’ in exactly the same sense too. What, 
then, would become of the Christian God? This pseudo-
anthropological/sociological approach which characterizes 
Clooney’s description of Hinduism is nowhere in 
evidence when he speaks about Christianity. Having 
set up the terms of comparison on these terms, Clooney 
goes on to speak about the further developments: “This 
Hinduism combines the complex indigenous and Vedic 
heritage, brahminical orthodoxy and ascetical extensions 
and alternatives…devotion to new, popular Gods such 
as Siva, Visnu, Rama, Krsna, leading to the formulation, 
particularly in brahminical discourses, of major theistic 
traditions…” (Clooney, 2010, pp.85-86). 
This Hinduism, over time, acquires “new” Gods, who 
are “popular” with the masses. From where did these 
‘Gods’ emerge? Whatever the answer, Clooney cannot 
possibly say that the Indians discovered these ‘Gods’ either 
in the world or outside it. They could not have found their 
‘Gods’ empirically in the world; if they did, their ‘Gods’ 
would be as real as any other object in the world. They 
could not have discovered them through ‘revelation’ either 
because, as a Jesuit priest, Clooney cannot allow for this 
possibility. Consequently, of necessity (this is a logical 
necessity), human beings could only have invented them. 
That is why these ‘Gods’ are “new” and their edification 
lies in their popularity with the masses. That is to say, 
the Indian “Gods and Goddesses” are mere inventions 
of human beings whereas, quite obviously, the Christian 
God is not. However, as Clooney says, Indians worship 
these gods and goddesses. How does Christianity call that 
worship which human beings do to their own creations? 
Historically, it has been called ‘idolatry’. In short, when 
Clooney sets up a comparison between his ‘Hinduism’ 
and his Christianity, his own terms of description sets up a 
comparison between idolatry and the worship of the ‘true’ 
God, or between the true religion and the false religions.
Historically, that is how Christianity set up the 
debate. But the virtue of that old discussion is that these 
ideas have been proclaimed openly and honestly by 
their proponents. Clooney, however, does not do so; he 
dissimulates instead.
2.2  The Diversity Argument
Clooney provides his brand of comparative theology 
with a justification for its existence. However, this too 
follows the nature of his arguments so far. It is every bit 
as contrived as the presentation of his notion of inter-
religious encounter and learning. To appreciate the force 
of this observation, we need to look at his basic argument 
about the need for comparative theology.
We live in a world where religious diversity is increasingly 
affecting and changing everything around us, and ourselves 
as well. No religious community is exempt from the pressures 
of diversity…If we are trying to make sense of our situation 
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amidst diversity and likewise keep our faith, some version of 
comparative theological reflection is required. (Clooney, 2010, 
p.3). 
In other words, the contemporary religious diversity 
and the need to retain one’s own religious practices are 
alleged to foster the need for comparative theology. How 
credible is this suggestion? 
By way of answering this question, let us keep the 
context of the origin of Christianity in mind. Surely, if 
nothing else, the Roman religious landscape was no less 
diverse than our own (Ruether, 1974; Wiedemann, 1990; 
Phillips Roberts, 1986). While it is true that Islam did not 
exist then, there existed more religious cults in the Roman 
Empire of yesteryears than what we see today. Given the 
contacts the Greeks had with India (McEvilley, 2002) and 
the travelogues written by them, one cannot argue that 
there was no knowledge of religious diversity in India 
back then. 
In that case, why did Christianity not indulge in 
comparative theology? Why did Christian theology 
not become comparative at the outset? The answer is 
that Christianity did compare: it compared itself to 
Judaism and to the multiple pagan traditions of its time. 
Christianity found all other religious traditions either 
wanting or false and proclaimed itself as the truth that 
even the pagans were implicitly striving to attain. The 
most noble among the Pagans were mere “preparations for 
the Gospels” (Praeparatione Evangelicae), as Eusebius, 
the early Church Father, put it.
It appears to me that there are two possibilities to 
choose from: either (i) Clooney does not endorse the 
truth-claims of Christianity, or (ii) he does not consider 
this the ‘right’ way of doing comparative theology. Given 
that he is writing as a Jesuit priest, we are not justified 
in assuming the first. However, if we choose the second 
of the two options, what are we to make of the following 
idea then? “Comparative theology is a practical response 
to religious diversity read with our eyes open, interpreting 
the world in light of our faith and with a willingness to see 
newly the truths of our own religion in light of another” 
(Clooney, 2010, p.69).
Should we assume that the early Christianity, the 
apostolic and the Early Church fathers read with their 
‘eyes closed’ and that they were unwilling “to see newly” 
the truths of their own religion? What, in any case, are 
“the truths” that Clooney has in mind? For example, 
Christianity has always claimed to be ‘the truth’ and that 
the pagan traditions are ‘false’ religions. What exactly 
does it mean to see this truth “newly”? Does the truth of a 
statement change into falsehood when looked at “newly”? 
If it does not, why look at it “newly” with one’s “eyes 
open”? This vague way of talking might help garner 
votes in an election, but it is pernicious to think in such 
an obfuscating manner when involved in the intellectual 
endeavour of building a comparative theology. In any 
case, without speaking about the ways in which ‘our’ 
religious diversity diverges from the diversities faced by 
early Christianity, there is not much mileage to Clooney’s 
comparative theology.
2.3  THE EARLIER COMPARATIVE 
THEOLOGIES
If there is one thing that is consistent in Clooney, it is 
his vague and nebulous language-use, which, I think, 
is deliberate. An isolated fact or even a few of them are 
brought in as evidence, while it is totally unclear what it 
evidences.
A. For example, St. Paul is alleged to have “in his own 
way…honored both Greek ritual and Greek literature” 
when he visits Aeropagus in Greece (Clooney, 2010, p.69). 
However Clooney does not tell us what this ‘honouring’ 
in Paul’s “own way” is an evidence for or even why what 
he does is an honour. 
So Paul stood before the whole council of the Areopagus and 
made this speech: ‘Men of Athens, I have seen for myself how 
extremely scrupulous [‘too superstitious’ in King James] you are 
in all religious matters, because, as I strolled round looking at 
your sacred monuments, I noticed among other things an altar 
inscribed: To An Unknown God. In fact, the unknown God you 
revere is the one I proclaim to you’. (The Acts, 17, p.22-23)
While I leave it to you do discover what honour is 
done to the Greek ritual here, St. Paul’s ‘honouring’ of the 
Greek literature “in his own way” consists of saying this: 
“Since it is in him that we live, and move, and exist, as 
indeed some of your own writers have said: We are all his 
children” (The Acts, 18, p.28). 
The Jerusalem Bible identifies the author of the 
citation, “We are all his Children,” as Aratus in his 
Phainomena. Thus, according to Clooney then, to cite an 
author is to honour the literary tradition of a people.
If we read how St. Paul felt about the Athenians and 
their city, we also discover the context for the alleged 
honour he bestows upon the Greeks: “Paul waited...in 
Athens and there his whole soul was revolted at the sight 
of a city given over to idolatry” (The Acts, 18:16).
I do not want to dispute with Clooney that this is St. 
Paul’s “own way” of bestowing “honour” upon Greek 
literature and Greek ritual. Even so, is the entire history 
of Christianity with its truth-claims undone by this 
‘honoring’ of Greek ritual and literature? Perhaps, one 
could be forgiven for asking whether Clooney too follows 
St. Paul in honouring ‘Hinduism’: does Clooney ‘honour’ 
the Hindus by citing their mantras and observing their 
‘superstition’, when he too is revolted by Hindu idolatry?
Continuing further, Clooney makes the following 
observation:
The theologians of the early Church were often learned in Greek 
and Latin literature, and possessed of detailed knowledge of 
Greek and Roman religion, and philosophy. Though confident 
about the novelty and uniqueness of the Christian message, 
they forged Christian identity in light of deep cultural affinities 
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present in the Mediterranean world, fierce ruptures with pagan 
belief and cult notwithstanding. Though often combative, 
their arguments for Christian distinctiveness were supported 
by considerable learning, and articulated through a deep 
appropriation of what was new and strange to them. (Clooney, 
2010, p.39)
Quite apart from the fact that the basic idea expressed 
here is very well-known to all the students of early 
Christianity, what exactly does this citation do? It is 
brought in as some kind of evidence for the existence early 
comparative theology. But can it function that way? If we 
are told that “some” (not all) early Christian theologians 
knew pagan thought and “some” (not all) of them knew it 
reasonably well and that they appropriated this “learning” 
in formulating Christian thinking, what exactly is proved 
thereby? Was not Tertullian criticizing precisely this 
“considerable learning” and “deep appropriation” when 
he asked, in The Prescription against the Heretics, “What 
has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the 
Academy and the Christian with the heretic?”
What Indeed? Nothing at all, affirmed Tertullian: 1
Our principles come from the Porch of Solomon…I have no use 
for a Stoic or a Platonic or a dialectic Christianity. After Jesus 
Christ we have no need of speculation, after the Gospel no need 
of research.2
The point is not to support Tertullian here but to notice 
that Clooney’s point has been used as evidence for its 
opposite in the early Christian tradition. In that case, what 
exactly is Clooney’s remark an evidence for?
B. Nowhere is this deliberate obfuscation more 
visible than in the way he talks about the early history of 
comparative theology, especially when referring to the 
early missionaries in India.
He indulges in quite a bit of hand-wringing while 
speaking about their failures: they are alleged to have 
been contaminated by ‘imperialist’ and ‘political’ ideas, 
even while motivated by intellectual desire to know and 
understand the Indian ‘religions’. 
The religious interactions of Hindus and (the)…newly arrived 
Western Christians…were complicated and often enough tainted 
by politics and power; here, too, learning was often enough 
narrowed by the presumption that the Indian religious traditions 
had no salvific value... Polemic crept into even the most 
energetic efforts to learn; debates were often counterproductive, 
even when a concern for truth was central. Yet the missionary 
documents show real theological concern for God, truth, and 
salvation. Faith…made the missionaries curious, and that 
curiosity instigated a great deal of learning. In the letters and 
treatises that have come down to us there is much information 
that would change European views of religion, and much 
1 Full text is in an old translation in Rev. Alexander Roberts and 
James Donaldson (eds), The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations 
of the Writings of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, Vol. 3, Latin 
Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian. American reprint of the 
Edinburgh edition (n.d.). (Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1978).
2 The alternate translation is cited from Avery Dulles, A History of 
Apologetics (London: Hutchinson and Co, 1971) p.43.
speculation that would affect how we all have thought about 
religion, its origins and development. (Clooney, 2010, p.26)
A quick reading generates the impression that Clooney 
is critical of the work of early missionaries; a careful 
reading shows nothing but obfuscations. The religious 
encounters between the Hinds and western Christians is 
said to be “often enough” tainted by “politics and power”, 
but ‘often enough’ for what purpose? The learning was 
“often enough narrowed”; but why did this ‘narrowing’ 
come into existence and of what did it consist? 
This notion of ‘learning’ is so loose that, in the case 
of India for example, it can only refer to the facts about 
the Indian ‘religions’ which the missionaries penned. 
Missionaries were ‘curious’, to be sure; but about what 
were they curious? We are supposed to applaud the 
missionary documents because these Christians showed 
a “real theological concern for God, truth, and salvation.” 
One would be surprised if the missionaries did not show 
such theological concerns. Finally, when he wrings his 
hands because he finds polemics “creeping” into even the 
most “energetic efforts to learn,” one feels like throwing 
up one’s hands; what precisely were the missionaries so 
‘energetically’ trying to learn? They were in India to convert 
people into Christianity and preach the Gospels. What were 
they supposed to learn except how to fulfill their vocation 
properly? Surely, all their ‘learning’ was an integral part of 
this endeavour. Clooney’s deliberate obfuscations here are 
not merely disingenuous; they are dishonest as well.
C. Even though I am not the most qualified to speak 
about Christian theology, I shall do so to draw the third 
element of disingenuity into the picture.
Clooney begins his characterization of theology as ‘faith 
seeking understanding’, which, understandably enough, 
he finds in Christianity and also, surprisingly, among the 
‘Hindus’. It is understandable because this well-known 
motto comes from St. Anslem (fides quaerens intellectum). 
But it is surprising because Clooney uncritically assumes 
as true what centuries before him also accepted without 
argument, evidence or proof, viz., Hinduism is also a 
religion. However, I will not take issue with this assumption 
here, but speak about Anslem’s motto instead.
The ‘faith’ of Anslem is the attitude of the believer 
towards God which is one of complete trust and total 
dependence. This is the attitude of ‘believing in’ somebody 
and not a mere act of believing in the truth of a proposition. 
Such faith, when held by a human being, is not a mere 
human achievement. Having or attaining this faith is a joint 
result of human attempt and divine working.
The ‘understanding’ of Anslem is the effort by the 
human intellect to grasp the nature of this faith. This 
finite and fallible process is aided by the infinite and 
infallible acts of revelations of God. When ‘faith seeks 
understanding’, we need to say: it is the faith of human 
beings in God that seeks to understand itself through 
human reason using God’s revelations.
That means to say that ‘faith seeking understanding’ 
makes sense only in the context of God’s working and 
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God’s revelations, without which neither faith nor the kind 
of understanding that Anslem speaks about is possible. 
Even if ‘Hinduism’ has “some salvific value” (Clooney 
2010:40), Clooney as a Christian priest is not claiming 
that the ‘Hindus’, when they do their ‘theologies’, are also 
doing what Anslem is talking about, is he? Not only does 
it distort Anslem and Christianity, it also distorts what the 
‘Hindus’ have been doing when they wrote their tracts.
Let me outline the difference between the two. When 
Christians talk about ‘faith seeking understanding’, they 
are talking about the experience of faith, which they 
are trying to understand. They have this faith in God. 
However, in the case of the Hindus, they have faith in 
experience; they believe that their truths are experiential 
in nature. The Christian’s faith in God is an attitude that 
undergirds all human experiences of the world; the Hindu’s 
faith in experience arises from the belief that experience 
tests the spiritual truths of traditions. One’s faith in Truth is 
the basis of all experience; the other’s faith in experience 
tests truths about the world. If one does not understand the 
different meanings accruing to the word ‘faith’ here, one 
distorts both Christianity and ‘Hinduism’.
However, in a typical manner, Clooney hedges: “I 
will argue for Hindu theology and Hindu comparative 
theology, though without arguing that “Hindu theology” 
is exactly like Christian theology” (Clooney, 2010, p.78).
Only Christian theology can be “exactly like Christian 
theology”; not even Islamic and Jewish theologies are 
“exactly like” Christian theology. What is interesting to 
know is how and in what sense the ‘Hindu’ theology is 
“exactly” unlike Christian theology and how, despite that, 
it too is ‘faith seeking understanding’. Clooney’s nebulous 
thinking does not allow of answers to such ‘exact’ questions.
2.3  Summary
Clooney has not touched any religious border in any sense 
of the term. His “deep learning” is disingenuous: it hides 
the fact that there is no learning. His distance from the early 
theologians is a vanishing point and woefully inadequate 
to understand diversity, whether Ancient or modern. The 
nebulous and vague story of Clooney does not even begin 
to capture the questions that the Indian culture and her 
‘religions’ have faced and continue to face. In this sense, 
if there is to be a true inter-religious dialogue, one needs 
honest and open discussions and not merely some well-
intentioned hand-wringing. Clooney had the possibility 
of beginning such a dialogue; but he has demonstrated his 
inability even to suspect the questions that underlie the 
task. It is high time that intellectuals ‘open their eyes’ and 
‘look newly’ at this reality, instead of being disingenuous 
if they want to seek truth.
3.  THE FUTURE OF A TASK
As the Indian culture becomes an increasingly important 
player on the world arena, both its historical and 
contemporaneous problems are beginning to get a fresh 
treatment in the hands of her intellectuals. Hitherto, their 
discourses were determined and constrained by what the 
western intellectuals said and did; that is increasingly 
less the case now. As a result of their research, Indian 
intellectuals are discovering issues and problems that the 
western intellectuals have become blind to. 
One such is about how a religion like Christianity 
could fruitfully approach and understand a culture like 
India. This requires looking anew at our own ideas about 
the so-called inter-religious encounters. If one simply 
accepts antiquated ideas about this phenomenon, there 
is no theologically acceptable way for a Christian to 
talk about other cultures except to fall back upon what 
has already been said before. The challenge is to remain 
faithful to one’s own religion (in this case, Christianity) 
and yet talk reasonably about other cultures and their 
traditions. However, to do this we need to go beyond the 
straight-jacketed thinking inherited from the past.
What does that thinking consist of? Amongst other things, 
it consists of the belief that all people, in all cultures, have 
their own brand of religion. Though almost all contemporary 
intellectuals believe in it, this idea is not ‘orthodox’ in any 
sense of the term. In fact, for centuries long, Europe knew 
of challenges to this belief from the Jesuits, especially when 
they encountered the Chinese Culture for the first time (Kors, 
1990). Today, of course, this dogma has even received a 
blessing in the form of pseudo-scientific speculations from 
evolutionary psychologists (Atran, 1990; Guthrie, 1993; 
Boyer, 2001; Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2007).
Once we understand the historical and contextual 
reasons for the emergence and acceptance of the idea of 
universality of religion (Balagangadhara, 2005), we will 
be in a position to rethink the entire debate about entities 
like ‘Hinduism’, ‘Buddhism’, ‘Jainism’ etc. (Bloch, 
Keppens, & Hegde, 2011) and also reconceptualize the so-
called ‘inter-religious’ encounters that we speak so much 
about. If it transpires that such ‘religions’ are intellectual 
and ‘imaginary’ constructions of the western culture 
(Almond, 1988) then, with this realization, we can really 
begin the exciting and fruitful task of theologically and 
philosophically making sense of the traditions that this 
culture has. If Indian culture does not have religions, 
how could we make sense of what we have hitherto been 
studying? If ‘Brahma’ and ‘deva’ are not Gods and deities 
a fortiori, then they cannot be false gods any more than 
‘Hinduism’ can be a false religion. In such a case, Christian 
theology will lose its negative and polemical edge but 
become instead the bearer of a positive set of messages.
Our current ideas about ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Buddhism’ 
have their first partial roots in the way the early Christians 
understood the Greek and Roman traditions. Here, 
Christianity’s early understanding of ‘paganism’ has 
ended up colouring our approaches to the contemporary 
world. The second part is to be traced to the polemics that 
the Reformation Christianity launched against Roman 
Catholicism, while also appealing to the Antique sources. 
In other words, an inter-Christian debate has ended up 
47 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
S. N. Balagangadhara (2014). 
Canadian Social Science, 10(5), 39-47
defining how we look at a culture like India. Today, the 
time is ripe to recognize this state of affairs and move 
away from those facts which have been determined by 
erroneous theories about cultures like India and ‘religions’ 
like ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Buddhism’.
It requires to be emphasized that these erroneous 
theories are the results of human thinking and human 
speculations. Any appeal to the Christian scriptures that 
transforms the Buddha or Vishnu into the embodiments 
of the Devil becomes theologically unfounded once we 
realize that these ‘religions’ quite simply do not exist 
outside the imagination of western intellectuals and their 
‘westernized’ counterparts in India. One can become more 
‘radical’ than the Nostra Aetate, which allows a mere 
“ray of light” to shine in other cultures, without losing 
out on ‘orthodoxy’. We need to begin serious theological 
reflections on phenomena that exist in India and not 
undertake ‘comparative theologies’ when under the sway 
of dogmas quasi-universally held in the West for centuries.
Of course, it is not easy to let go of centuries of 
straight-jacketed thinking. It literally took us centuries 
to free ourselves from geocentric theories. This physical 
phenomenon, where we see the daily movement of the 
sun around earth, has its cultural counterpart: the temples, 
the statues, the incense, the puja, the mantras and the 
breaking of coconuts. Like the Aristotelians of yester 
years, we too have our pundits, priests and philosophers 
who expound on how the ‘nirguna Brahman’ is a 
variant of the God of Christianity or how ‘Narayana’ is 
a “new and popular God” or how Laksmi is a Goddess 
worshipped by ‘Hindus’. Much like the vast impact 
that Aristotelian philosophy had, we have sociologists, 
anthropologists, psychologists and religious studies 
specialists waxing eloquent on the ‘world religions’. We 
even have our academies, much bigger than what the 
Ancient philosopher had: each respectable university has 
its own ‘centre of world religions’ or a graduate course on 
‘Hinduism’. However, now, as then, we need people who 
dare think and rethink what we see in this world and of 
what it is made up. If, as then, we seek truth and intend to 
move forward, we need to question radically our inherited 
experiences of the world and the staid dogmas that sustain 
them. This is the task facing us in Nostra Aetate, our time, 
which is the world of the twenty-first century and beyond.
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